“新)多边主义”：当旧世界秩序松动，中国提出另一种答案

更新时间：2026-02-18 18:27 来源：牛马见闻

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�, as it builds upon American multilateralism (AM), the traditional world order led by the US since World War II, while

Club提要：北京)对话特！约专家、北外副教授顾宾在ThinkChina（思想中国）发文指出，美国主导的世界秩序因霸权滥用和全球南方代表性不足而加速崩溃，中国正以全球治理倡议引领“新多边主义”。通过构建“七大支柱”理论，顾宾系统对比了中美多边主义之间的差异。北京对话获授权翻译发布。 （翻译：李雨琪核译：金地） 顾宾在ThinkChina发文截屏（图源：思想中国） 随着特朗普2.0时代的到来，大体上已良好运转约80年的世界秩序正在加速崩溃。新的世界秩序将是什么样子？新旧世界秩序之间的过渡将如何展开？过渡期间是否会发生第三次世界大战？ 当今世界秩序的衰败源于两个主要因素：美国对霸权的滥用以及全球南方在全球事务中代表性不足。 特朗普的“对等关税”，和对格陵兰岛的“志在必得”，打开了潘多拉魔盒，即以维护国家安全为名，实现其所有的货币、经济和地缘政治利益。其结果是，用世界贸易组织总干事伊韦阿拉的外交辞令来说，全球贸易秩序受到了“扰动”。 2025年9月，伊韦阿拉接受路透社采访时指出，全球贸易规则正经历“过去80年来最大程度的扰动”（图源：路透社） 中国的全球治理倡议比以往任何时候都更具现实意义 “无代表权，不纳税”这一口号集中体现了18世纪触发美国独立战争的不满情绪。长期以来，国际社会也存在类似的不公平现象——“有贡献，无代表权”。然而，新兴经济体和发展中国家追求的只是改良，而非革命。 加拿大总理卡尼在达沃斯描述的“断裂”一词，反衬中国的全球治理倡议在稳定世界局势方面最新、最有力的领导行动。 2025年9月，中国国家主席在上合组织天津峰会期间提出全球治理倡议，为全球治理体系与时俱进贡献中国智慧（图源：央视新闻） 正如中国国家领导人2025年在上海合作组织天津峰会上提出的，全球治理倡议坚持将多边主义作为全球治理的路径。 具体而言，首先，多边主义处于现有世界秩序的核心；必须受到维护而不是侵蚀。 其次，多边主义的本质是“大家的事大家商量着办”，正如中国古语所云：众人拾柴火焰高。 第三，还必须要防范和杜绝一切单边主义和歧视行为。这两者造成了当今困扰所有人的不确定性。 中国领导下的“新多边主义” 为了在全球治理倡议下重振高效的多边主义，我不揣浅陋提出一个新的理论——“新多边主义”，即中国领导下的中国式多边主义。 “新多边主义”的特点是“传承与创新”。它以由美国自二战后领导的、作为传统世界秩序的美国式多边主义为基础，同时借鉴了中国的两项全球倡议——“一带一路”倡议和亚洲基础设施投资银行。 2015年6月29日，《亚洲基础设施投资银行协定》签署仪式在北京举行（图源：人民网） “新多边主义”建立在七个相互依存的支柱之上。 第一大支柱是决策机制，体现了霸权与协商之争。与美国式多边主义中由美国充当霸权不同，“新多边主义”在决策中以广泛协商为先。 正如美国在布雷顿森林体系中拥有否决权一样，中国在亚投行也拥有否决权。但拥有否决权是一回事，滥用则是另一回事。从文化基因角度来说中，中国与霸权国要强加自己意志的思维形成对比，中国会通过博得尊重而非强制改变来影响他人。 第二大支柱是集体治理，体现了对抗性制衡与协商性参与之争。美国式多边主义遵循西方式的对抗性制衡，而“新多边主义”则倾向于协商性参与的东方智慧。 软法与硬法 亚投行内部设有监督机制，以确保其非常驻董事会与管理层之间存在“适当的制衡”，而适当程度则取决于该行的亚洲血统。这种模式强调团结与融洽，促进互联互通与协作共赢。在当前世界恃强凌弱行为激增之际，这种和解与和谐的精神显得愈发重要。 第三大支柱是国际立法，体现了硬法与软法之争。与美国式多边主义拥有悠久、正式、刚性的国际立法传统相反，“新多边主义”重视非正式、柔性的国际立法。在条约和其他硬法之外，“一带一路”倡议的法律体系主要由软法构成。其模糊、松散和灵活的特点，促成了这个有史以来最大国际发展平台在21世纪的快速扩张。在我们这个动荡的时代，柔性的国际立法确实重要且有效。 2023年10月10日，国务院新闻办公室发布《共建“一带一路”：构建人类命运共同体的重大实践》白皮书（图源：新华社） 第四大支柱是条约解释，体现了法治与法律的作用之争。美国式多边主义从形式主义性的角度维护法治，而“新多边主义”则从目的论的角度审视法律的作用。目的论解释使得国际组织像一棵活树一样，能够在其自然限度内发展和壮大，而这些限度都植根于组织章程中的目的性条款中。目的论方法通过灵活解释其章程，为亚投行投资“一带一路”项目以及发放政策性贷款提供了正当性。 第五大支柱是标准制定，体现了最佳国际实践与高而可行的标准之争。与美国式多边主义坚持最佳实践（隐含“一刀切”的弊病）不同，“新多边主义”推崇平衡的、高而可行的标准。亚投行的运营，力行高标准，在文本和实践中都全面落实了环境、社会和治理标准。同时，亚投行也以借款国的利益为先，顾及它们的当地条件。 第六大支柱是业界同行，体现了对抗与合作之争。“新多边主义”认为，与外部机构特别是那些业内成熟机构建立合作关系是其作为新机构取得成功的关键。亚投行通过签署谅解备忘录和共同融资项目，与世界银行及其他同行机构建立了务实、协作的关系。此举帮助亚投行在建立声誉和能力建设方面进步神速。 2024年时任亚投行行长金立群与世界银行行长彭安杰签署合作协议（图源：亚投行） 中国重视不断自我完善和构建伙伴关系 第七大支柱是中国的角色，体现了联盟关系与伙伴关系之争。中国梦由“实现中华民族伟大复兴”和“构建人类命运共同体”两大核心构成。为实现这一目标，中国专注于不断自我完善和构建伙伴关系，同时避免树敌。中国与所有人同行，而不针对任何人，这与美国式霸权——“要么为伍，要么为敌”形成鲜明对比。 中国在全球治理中的领导力体现在改革美国主导的传统机构，以及发起“一带一路”倡议和亚投行上。例如，在世贸组织中，中国提出了一项投资便利化协议，并与欧洲共同提出了一个上诉仲裁替代机制。中国还承诺在世贸组织中不再寻求特殊和差别待遇，同时为全球南方国家在电子商务能力建设项目上提供慷慨资助——电子商务正是中国自身发展经验的优势所在。 2025年9月23日，国务院总理李强在纽约联合国总部出席由中方主办的全球发展倡议高级别会议并致辞，强调中国作为负责任的发展中大国，在世贸组织当前和未来谈判中将不寻求新的特殊和差别待遇（图源：新华社） 因此，中国正展现出更多自信，并采取具体步骤帮助塑造新的世界秩序，积极呼应数十年前时任美国副国务卿佐利克呼吁中国成为“负责任的利益攸关方”的言论。 2005年9月19日，时任美国副国务卿罗伯特·佐利克在华盛顿向美中关系全国委员会发表政策演讲，呼吁中国成为“负责任的利益攸关方”（图源：美中关系委员会） 以下为英文原文： With the dawn of Trump 2.0, the world order, which had largely been working well for 80 years, is hastening its pace of collapse. What will the new world order look like, how will the transition unfold and will there even be a third world war in the interim? The decay of the present-day world order is due to two main factors: the US’s abuse of hegemony and the Global South’s underrepresentation in global affairs. Trump’s “reciprocal tariffs” and “no going back” approach to getting Greenland have opened up a Pandora’s box of achieving whatever monetary, economic and geopolitical interests he wants in the name of safeguarding national security. As a result, the global trade order has been “jolted”, quoting World Trade Organization (WTO) director-general Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala’s diplomatic language. China’s Global Governance Initiative more relevant than ever The slogan “No taxation without representation” captures the grievances that triggered the American War of Independence in the 18th century. A similarly unfair phenomenon — “contribution without representation”, has existed for a long time in the international community. Yet emerging economies and developing nations are only seeking evolution, not revolution. In the midst of a “rupture”, quoting Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at Davos, the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) marks China’s latest, most potent action of leadership in stabilising world situations. As proposed by President Xi Jinping at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit last year, GGI upholds multilateralism as the pathway to global governance. To elaborate, first, multilateralism is placed at the very core of the existing world order; it must be preserved, rather than eroded. Second, the essence of multilateralism is framed as “decided by all, built by all, and shared by all”. It means, if we all chipin and add wood to the bonfire, the flames will be much higher, as an old Chinese saying goes. Third, in parallel, all practices of unilateralism and discrimination must be avoided and rejected. This clearly pinpoints and targets the main cause of uncertainty troubling us all today. ‘New multilateralism’ under China’s leadership For the purpose of reviving an effective and efficient multilateralism under GGI, I will humbly present a new theory — “new multilateralism” (NM), or Chinese multilateralism under China’s leadership. NM features “heritage and innovation”, as it builds upon American multilateralism (AM), the traditional world order led by the US since World War II, while drawing on a few new case studies, namely the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), two of China’s global initiatives. NM builds itself upon seven interdependent pillars. The first pillar is decision-making, featuring hegemony versus consultation. In contrast to AM where the US acts a hegemon, NM prioritises broad-based consultation in decision-making. China holds a veto power in the AIIB, as the US does in Bretton Woods institutions. But holding a veto power is one thing; to abuse it is another. In its cultural genes, China is not a missionary society; it chooses to influence others by inducing respect rather than by conversion, contrasting with a hegemon’s mentality to impose its will on others. The second pillar is corporate governance, featuring adversarial checks versus advisory engagement. While AM follows the Western style of adversarial checks, NM leans towards the Oriental wisdom of advisory engagement. Soft vs hard laws The AIIB has a built-in oversight mechanism “to ensure proper checks and balances” between its non-resident board and management, where the degree of propriety lies along a spectrum, depending on the Bank’s Asian genes. This model features unity and collegiality, and promotes connectivity and collaboration.As the world is witnessing a surge in bullying, this spirit of reconciliation and harmony is all the more essential. The third pillar is international lawmaking, featuring hard laws versus soft laws. As opposed to AM, which enjoys a strong tradition of formal and hard international lawmaking, NM cherishes informal and soft international lawmaking. The legal corpus of BRI is mainly made up of soft laws, alongside treaties and other hard laws. Notwithstanding being vague, loose and flexible, this feature contributes to the quick expansion of the largest-ever international development platform in the 21st century. Indeed, soft international lawmaking matters and works amid our tumultuous times. The fourth pillar is treaty interpretation, featuring rule of law versus role of law. While AM upholds the rule of law from an angle of formality, NM examines the role of law from a teleological perspective. Teleological interpretation enables an international organisation, like a living tree, to grow and expand within its natural limits, which are embedded in the purposive clause in the organisation’s charter. The teleological approach justifies the AIIB investing in BRI projects, as well as taking up policy-based loans, by flexibly interpreting its laws. The fifth pillar is standard setting, featuring best international practice versus high and feasible standards. In contrast to AM’s way of upholding best practices, which implies the stigma of one size fits all, NM embraces balanced, high and feasible standards. High standards are integral in the operations of the AIIB, which has instituted environmental, social, and governance standards (ESG) both in text and in practice. At the same time, the AIIB also prioritises the interests ofborrowing countries, and takes into account their local conditions. The sixth pillar is peer institutions, featuring confrontation versus cooperation. According to NM, forging a cooperative external relationship, particularly with those established ones, is key to the success of a newcomer. The AIIB has forged a pragmatic, collaborative relationship with the World Bank and other peer institutions, by signing memorandums of understanding and co-financing projects. This approach has helped the AIIB to make rapid progress in building up its reputation and capacity building. China prizes continuous self-improvement and partnership-building The seventh pillar is the role of China, featuring alliance versus partnership. The Chinese dream is two-pronged, consisting of “rejuvenating the nation” and “building a community of shared future for mankind”. To make this happen, China tends to concentrate on continuous self-improvement and partnership-building, while avoiding making enemies. China is with everybody and against nobody, which contrasts against US-branded hegemony — “either with us or against us”. China’s leadership in global governance is demonstrated in reforming US-led traditional institutions, as well as in initiating the BRI and the AIIB. In the WTO, for example, China initiated an investment facilitation agreement, and alongside Europe, an alternative appellate arbitration mechanism. China also pledged not to seek new special treatment in the WTO, while generously funding capacity building programmes for the Global South in e-commerce, where China’s own development experience excels. Thus, China is showing more confidence, with concrete steps, in helping to shape the new world order, positively echoingthen US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s call decades ago for China to become a “responsible stakeholder”. 本文原文首发于ThinkChina（思想中国），原文链接：https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/chinas-new-multilateralism-rival-us-led-order?ref=home-latest-articles ThinkChina（思想中国）是由新加坡华文媒体《联合早报》于2019年推出的英文电子杂志平台，旨在为英语读者提供关于中国的深度观察和分析。

编辑：岸佑二